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employee status has a recurring annual nature. In the subtle area of motivation,
the nature of the status must be taken into account. In the final analysis, it
should be the taxpayer's choice of which status gave rise to the bad debt. Cor-
roborating testimony certainly must be present, but when circumstances sur-
rounding the creation of the debt indicate that the dominant and primary
motivation for the debt was the interest of the taxpayer in his trade or business,
then the business bad debt deduction must be allowed, even when secondary
considerations of an investment nature also exist.
Orrin L. Harrison, III
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited: A New
Route for Noerr-Pennington and the Sham Exception
Plaintiffs filed an antitrust class action on behalf of fourteen common car-
riers operating in California and other states against nineteen other trucking
firms with similar operations. The complaint alleged that the defendants had
conspired to restrain trade, monopolize the common carrier business,' and put
their competitors out of business, in violation of the Sherman Act.' Plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief and treble damages under the Clayton Act.' Both
parties to the suit were regulated by the California Public Utility Commission
and the Interstate Commerce Commission.4 Plaintiffs alleged that the defend-
ants formed a special trust fund for the purpose of instituting a program of
continuous and systematic opposition to all requests and applications for
operating rights submitted to these regulatory agencies by the plaintiffs. When
a ruling unfavorable to defendants was rendered, it was contended that they
continued their opposition by judicial appeal. The scheme of opposition was
alleged to have been carried out regardless of the merits of the application or
the competitive interest of the defendants. The plaintiffs contended that as a
result of this scheme they were deterred from filing and pursuing applications
with the regulatory agencies and the courts because of the expense involved in
answering the challenges of defendants, and thus competition was decreased.
The complaint was dismissed by the district court' for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.! The court held that the activities of the
defendants fell within the exception to the Sherman Act enunciated in Eastern
' 1967 Trade Cas. 5 72,298, at 84,739 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
215 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970). Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....... Section 2 provides:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States or with foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ..
3 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
" Carriers operating in interstate commerce must obtain a certificate of convenience and
necessity from the ICC in addition to any required by the state regulatory agency. The routes
and rates are regulated by both agencies.
'1967 Trade Cas. 5 72,298, at 84,739 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6).
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Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.' The Ninth
Circuit reversed,' holding the Noerr doctrine inapplicable; and, in the alterna-
tive, if it were applicable the defendant's actions were not immune as they
constituted a direct restraint of trade, rather than an indirect restraint through
influencing governmental action. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.9 Held, affirmed: The right of free and unlimited access to regula-
tory agencies and the courts may be invoked for the purpose of eliminating
competition, but this right is not immune from regulation by the antitrust
laws when it is used in the furtherance of a conspiracy to deter others from
exercising that same right of access. California Motor Transport Co. v. Truck-
ing Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
I. THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE:
AN EXTENSION OF ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
The Antitrust Act. The Sherman Act seeks to promote "free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade."'" It was intended to prevent all contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies which restrain or monopolize trade." The
Clayton Act provides a private remedy for violation of the proscriptions of the
Sherman Act by allowing recovery of treble damages."2 It has been held that
the intent of the Congress was "to go to the utmost extent of its constitutional
power in restraining trusts and monopoly agreements."" The Act, however,
has been construed and applied using the standard of reasonableness. 4 The
scope of the Act has further been limited by statutory exemptions 5 and ju-
dicially implied exceptions."
Development of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. The major exception to the
proscriptions of the Sherman Act originated in United States v. Rock-Royal
365 U.S. 127 (1961). "No violation of the Sherman Act can be predicated upon mere
attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws." Id. at 135.
'Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
'California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 402 U.S. 1008 (1970).
1 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
" 15 U.S.C. SS 1-2 (1970); see note 2 supra.
"2 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
"United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 538 (1944). See also
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
The broad scope of the Sherman Act as set forth in 5§ 1 and 2 is said to "embrace
every conceivable act which could possibly come within the spirit or purpose of the law,
without regard to the garb in which such acts are clothed." American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946). The Court further held that it is irrelevant that the
means used to accomplish an unlawful objective are in themselves wholly innocent, as they
come within the prohibitions of the Act when used to further a conspiracy which it forbids.
Nor is it necessary that the power to restrain trade which is derived from the unlawful con-
spiracy actually be exercised in order for them to be in violation of the Sherman Act, Id.
at 809-10.
"Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911), for discussion by the Court of the "rule of reason"
as the standard that is used to apply § 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
" See generally Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions from Antitrust, 19 ABA ANTITRUST
SEcrION 313 (1961); see also id. at 330-54 for a list of the exemptions.




Co-operative, Inc.,, and Parker v. Brown." In these two cases the Supreme
Court held that governmental action pursuant to valid legislation which re-
sults in a restraint of trade or the creation of a monopoly is immune from the
prohibitions of the Act, as it is not within the purpose of the Act to regulate
the acts of government.
The Supreme Court, from the premise of Rock-Royal and Parker, carved
out a yet broader exception to the Sherman Act in Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc." Noerr granted antitrust immunity
to combinations of individuals who were seeking to influence the legislature
or executive to take action similar in nature to that protected by Rock-Royal
and Parker. The holding of Noerr was a logical extension of the Rock-Royal
and Parker principle.
In Noe"rr a group of railroads conspired to restrain and monopolize trade in
the long-distance heavy-haul business by carrying out an intensive campaign
of publicity intended to harm the image and customer relations of the plain-
tiff trucking lines. Through lobbying, the railroads sought to secure passage of
legislation favorable to themselves and unfavorable to the trucking industry."
The Noerr Court initially considered the applicability of the Sherman Act on
the premise that "where a restraint upon trade is the result of valid govern-
mental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the Sherman Act
can be made out.""' The Court concluded that there was an "essential dis-
similarity between an agreement to jointly seek legislation or law enforce-
ment and the agreements traditionally condemned by Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.". In addition to "essential dissimilarity," the Court based its conclusion
on two other propositions: (1) As the government does have within its
authority the power to enact and enforce legislation which restrains trade or
creates a monopoly, to hold that the people represented by the government
cannot, because they have a financial interest in its actions, "inform the govern-
ment of their desires would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate
not business activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no
basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act."'" (2) To impute such a
'7307 U.S. 533 (1939).
"s317 U.S. 341 (1943). The court concluded:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to
nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attri-
buted to Congress.
Id. at 350-51.
"0365 U.S. 127 (1961).
"The railroads persuaded the Governor of Pennsylvania to veto legislation known as
the Fair Truck Bill, which would have permitted the truckers to carry heavier loads. Id. at
130. In addition, they sought to procure the passage of state laws regulating the taxes im-
posed upon heavy trucks, and to encourage the strict enforcement of such laws. Id. at 131.
" id. at 135. The Court cited Parker v. Brown for this proposition.
2 Id. at 136. The Court noted that combinations violative of the Sherman Act are
"ordinarily characterized by an express or implied agreement or understanding that the
participants will jointly give up their trade freedom, or help one another to take away the
trade freedom of others through the use of such devices as price-fixing agreements, boycotts,
market division agreements and other similar arrangements." Id.
2
3 1d. at 137.
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NOTES
purpose to the Sherman Act would raise the question of invasion of the first
amendment right to petition the government. 4
The Court in Noerr did, however, note that situations could arise in which
attempts to interfere directly with a competitor might be cloaked in the guise
of mere solicitation of governmental action. In such a situation the Sherman
Act would be applicable.'
In 1965 the Supreme Court applied and extended the Noerr principle in
United Mine Workers v. Pennington." The defendants in Pennington were
alleged to have violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to seek the imposition
by the Secretary of Labor of a minimum wage for employees of companies
selling coal to the TVA, 7 and conspiring to persuade the TVA not to purchase
coal from companies which were exempt from the wage. The Court reiterated
the holding of Noerr and broadened its scope:
(1) Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws
even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal
either standing alone or as a part of a broader scheme itself violative of the
Sherman Act.
(2) Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public
officials regardless of intent or purpose."
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, as developed in its parent cases, is a broad
grant of antitrust immunity for lobbying designed to influence the passage
and enforcement of legislation. The broad language of the Court in Noerr
and Pennington has led to varied results as the lower courts have granted the
immunity to activities which bear little similarity to those of Noerr and Pen-
nington."8 The reach of the doctrine is a question not clearly answered by
Noerr or Pennington.
II. THE "SHAM EXCEPTION"
While holding in Noerr that lobbying was immune from the proscriptions
of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of abuse of
this immunity:
'Id. at 138. "The right to petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights, and we cannot, of course lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade those free-
doms." Id.
2 Id. at 144. See text accompanying note 32 infra. See also Costilo, Antitrust's Newest
Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L. REV. 333, 352 (1967); Comment,
Lobbying Before Licensing Agencies: Noerr-Pennington Re-assessed, 51 B.U.L. REV. 90,
104-05 (1970).28381 U.S. 657 (1965).
27 Id. at 660. The defendants in the UMW and the large coal companies felt that there
was over-production at this time and that the situation could be corrected by placing control
of the market in the hands of a few large companies. Toward this end of market control,
they persuaded the Secretary of Labor to set a minimum wage which would make "it difficult
for small companies to compete in the TVA term contract market." Id. The Secretary of
Labor is empowered to set a minimum wage in industries contracting with the Government
by the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. S 35 (1970). The defendants then met with the TVA
to persuade it to eliminate its spot market purchases of coal, as many of the companies from
whom these purchases were made were exempt from the minimum wage set by the Secretary
of Labor. Id. at 660-61. See Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemptions After Pennington and
Jewel Tea, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 742 (1966); Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 55
CALIF. L. REV. 254 (1967), for antitrust implications concerning organized labor.28 d. at 670 (emphasis added).2gSee Comment, Whitten v. Paddock: The Sherman Act and the "Government Action"
Immunity Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 140, 150-56 (1971).
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There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed
toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would
be justified."0
The Court thus established the test for applicability of the "sham exception"
as being whether the interference was direct or indirect. The campaign of
lobbying and publicity conducted in Noerr was not such a sham."1 The rail-
road's campaign did not, however, measure up to "the ethical standards gen-
erally approved in this country,""0 but as the Court pointed out: "Insofar as
[the Sherman] Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that condemns
trade restraints, not political activity .. .."" The truckers in Noerr were in-
jured directly by this campaign, but there was a lack of evidence indicating
that "the railroads had attempted directly to persuade anyone not to deal with
the truckers."' " Whatever injury they suffered was "an incidental effect of the
railroads' campaign to influence governmental action."' The Noerr Court
concluded that so long as the lobbying campaign was a genuine effort to in-
fluence governmental action the basis for the grant of immunity was present,
and would not be affected by the incidental injury of a competitor.' The factor
which the Court considered to be determinative in applying the direct-indirect
interference test was whether there was a genuine effort to influence legislation.
The fact that the railroads intended the incidental injury to be inflicted was not
relevant. This is entirely consistent with the holding in Pennington that "Noerr
shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials
regardless of intent or purpose.0
7
The "sham exception" as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Noerr utiliz-
ing the direct-indirect interference test has generally not been applied by the
lower courts. Although one case did apply the direct-indirect interference
test, it concluded the conduct was genuinely aimed at influencing governmental
action, thus it was not a "mere sham."'
30365 U.S. at 144.
I ld. The Court said that "each group appears to have utilized all the political powers
it could muster in an attempt to bring about the passage of laws that would help it or injure
the other. But the contest itself appears to have been conducted along lines normally accept-
ed in our political system ..... Id. at 145.321d. at 140. The campaign utilized the "third party technique," whereby propaganda
actually circulated by a party in interest is made to appear to be the reaction of an inde-
pendent source. Id.
33Id.34 Id. at 142.
' Id. at 143. The injuries sustained by the truckers were to their "relationships with the
public and with customers." The net result was the overall weakening of the truckers' com-
petitive position.
"The Court noted that it is inevitable that such injuries would occur in a lobbying
campaign and that the party conducting the campaign would know of and probably be
pleased by the injury. "To hold that the knowing infliction of such injury renders the cam-
paign itself illegal would thus be tantamount to outlawing all such campaigns . . . and
this has not been done by anything in the Sherman Act." Id. at 143-44.
31381 U.S. at 670.
3 Schenley Indus., Inc. v. N.J. Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n, 272 F. Supp. 872,
883-86 (D.N.J. 1967). The plaintiffs contended that conduct violative of state law rendered
the defendants actions a sham, but the Court rejected this contention; and after applying
the direct-indirect interference test concluded that the "sham exception" was inapplicable. Id.
(Vol. 26
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III. CALIFORNIA MOTOR TRANSPORT CO. V. TRUCKING UNLIMITED
The United States Supreme Court resolved two issues in Trucking Unlimited.
First, did the Noerr-Pennington doctrine apply when an effort was made to
influence a court or an administrative agency which was functioning in an
adjudicative capacity? Second, if the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applied to
judicial and administrative proceedings, what was to be the role of the "sham
exception"? The Court quickly disposed of the first question by answering in
the affirmative:
[I]t would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that
groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws,
use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to
advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business
and economic interests vis-i-vis their competitors."9
The Court used the same two-pronged rationale applied in Noerr in reaching
this conclusion."
The holding settled the controversy that arose from the language used in
Noerr which indicated that the doctrine applied only when legislative or
executive action was sought."' The Court held that the right to petition ex-
tended to all branches of government. The Court, by so holding, avoided the
complex problem of determining when an agency is acting in a policy-making
capacity (legislative) and when it is acting in an adjudicative capacity (quasi-
judicial) .'
Having resolved the first issue, the Court turned to the plaintiff's allegations
to determine if, taken at face value, they stated a claim upon which relief
could be granted. In making this determination, the Court evaluated the appli-
cability of the "sham exception" to activities otherwise immune from the
proscriptions of the Sherman Act in light of their extension of Noerr-Penning-
ton. The Court considered critical the allegations "that the power, strategy,
and resources of the defendants were used to harass and deter the plaintiffs in
their use of administrative and judicial proceedings so as to deny them 'free
and unlimited access' to those tribunals."'
The defendants relied upon the holding of Pennington that "Noerr shields
"1404 U.S. at 510-11.
' Id. at 510. See notes 23 and 24 supra, and accompanying text.
41 "(The Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating together
in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action .... "
365 U.S. at 136. It has been suggested that NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), stands
for the proposition that the right to petition extends to all branches of the government.
Note, Use of the Judicial or Administrative Adjudicatory Process Should be Exempt from
the Antitrust Laws, 31 MD. L. REV. 174, 180 (1971).
'See the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, 432 F.2d at 758, noted in 22 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1151 (1971). The Ninth Circuit held Noerr-Pennington immunity to be inapplicable to
agency and judicial proceedings. The court reasoned that the defense was inapplicable be-
cause the fundamental reason for the defense, the need to insure access to information and
private opinion, is not relevant in the adjudicatory process. The courts and agencies act
in an adjudicatory capacity. They do not enact or enforce laws restraining trade, as do the
legislature and executive. Thus, there is no valid reason to "limit the reach of the Sherman
Act in order to protect access of courts and agencies engaged in adjudicative functions to
information and opinion relevant to determinations they have no power to make." 432
F.2d at 758-59.
1404 U.S. at 511.
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from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless
of intent or purpose."" The Court found this holding inapplicable to the plain-
tiffs' allegations that the defendants sought to deny them access to the agencies
and courts. In Trucking Unlimited the Court was actually looking at a
different level of intent from that to which the language in Noerr was ad-
dressed. In Noerr the Court was referring to the intent to lessen competition,
which was the purpose of the campaign. The Court in Trucking Unlimited
was referring to the intent to interfere with the administrative and judicial
processes, and thereby achieve a lessening of competition.' The "intent or
purpose" of a party seeking Noerr-Pennington immunity is controlling only
in a situation where it is alleged that there is a direct interference. Had the
defendants, with the intent to lessen competition, sought to change the policy
of the regulatory agencies of freely granting operating rights,"' the "sham
exception" would not have been applied. Such activities would have been
indirect interference falling behind the protective shield of Noerr-Pennington.
After distinguishing the allegations of Trucking Unlimited, the Court at-
tempted to establish guidelines for application of the "sham exception" to
cases involving administrative and judicial processes. In adapting the Noerr-
Pennington defense to these processes, the Court recognized that there were
inherent differences between the legislative and executive processes which oper-
ate in the political arena, and the administrative and judicial processes. The
Court further recognized that activities condoned in the political arena "may
corrupt the administrative and judicial processes and ... result in antitrust vio-
lations."4 Thus, the holding that the ethics of conspirators in the political
sphere is legally irrelevant to the application of Noerr-Pennington immunity"
does not hold true for the application of that immunity in the administrative or
judicial setting. The integrity of these processes is dependent upon the ethics of
those who invoke them. Misrepresentation and puffing of claims which are ac-
cepted in the political system would constitute an abuse of the process in the
judicial setting. As an example, the Court cited the persistent voicing of base-
less claims."'
The Court recognized the difficulty facing the factfinder in deciding when
a party's activities were an abuse of process because they denied competitors
free and unlimited access to the administrative and judicial systems. However,
the Court held that once this conclusion was drawn "the case is established
4Id.
Id. at 511-12.
"The state agency encouraged competition in the common carrier business by "freely
granting, and approving the transfer of, certificates of public convenience and necessity.
Until 1963 it was the policy of the Interstate Commerce Commission to register any certifi-
cate issued by the state agency automatically, without further hearing." 432 F.2d at 762.
'1404 U.S. at 513.
"365 U.S. at 140-42. The lower courts in Noerr had in part based their application
of the Sherman Act upon the unethical conduct of the railroads. The particular activities
being the use of the so-called "third party technique." See note 32 supra, and accompanying
text. The Supreme Court rejected for all purposes the consideration of the ethics of the
parties, as their actions were political activity, which is not within the scope of the Sherman
Act. Id.
49404 U.S. at 513.
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that the abuse of those processes produced an illegal result.""0 The result of
denying access by abusing the agency and judicial processes, therefore, cannot
acquire antitrust immunity in the guise of political expression. To do so would
allow "First Amendment Rights ... to be used ... [to achieve) 'substantive
evils' which the legislature has the power to control."'"
Thus, in Trucking Unlimited the Court found that if the plaintiff's allega-
tions are proved the antitrust laws will have been violated, as the allegations
"[on their face come within the 'sham exception' . . . as adapted to the
adjudicatory process."" The defendants would have gone beyond their first
amendment right to use the processes of the agencies and courts to defeat
acquisition of operating rights by the plaintiffs if it was proven that their real
intention was to directly interfere with their competitors by denying them
access to these processes."
IV. CONCLUSION
The extension of Noerr-Pennington immunity to agency and judicial pro-
ceedings was fully in accord with the purposes of the doctrine set forth in
Noerr. The Court in Trucking Unlimited, however, seems to have gone beyond
both the purpose of the Sherman Act and the allegations of the plaintiffs in
adapting the sham exception to the adjudicative process. The Court made the
determination required by Noerr for application of the sham exception, i.e.,
that there was not a genuine effort to influence governmental action, rather
there was an attempt to directly interfere with a competitor. In addition to
this test, the Court went on to find abuse of process; citing perjury, fraud,
bribery, and misrepresentation as examples. Had the Court confined its inquiry
to the allegations necessary to find a direct interference, rather than basing
its decision in part upon abuse of process, which was not alleged in the com-
plaint, nor included within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, a more
discernible line concerning the type of activities falling within the sham
exception would have been drawn by this case. The type of abuses which the
Court cites would better have been left to the agency and judicial remedies,
i.e., dismissal or charges of perjury or contempt. Despite its emphasis on pro-
tection of the judicial and administrative processes, however, the Court's de-
cision would appear to be correct under the Noerr test, since the denial of
access to the courts and agencies would be a direct interference, and thus fall
within the sham exception.
Jerry L. Head
501d. The Court, in discussing the abuse of process, referred to perjury, fraud, and mis-
representation, although none of these activities were alleged in the complaint.5 Id. at 514.5 1 Id. at 516.
" Id. at 515. The basis for the Noerr-Pennington protection would in this case not exist,
as "[if the end result is unlawful, it matters not that the means used in violation may be
lawful." Id.
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